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Transnational corporations (TNCs) are a phenomenon born from globalisation. As markets 
become increasingly open to foreign investors, business corporations are able to continually 
expand their activities and diversify their subsidiaries. Those who manage to grasp the 
opportunities beyond national borders can reap great profits, but also immense economic, social 
and political power. As stated by Tony Blair in 2007, ‘[b]usiness gets involved in politics, not as 
partisans of a political party, but as important actors in global debate.’1 The power of TNCs is 
especially palpable in developing countries, whose development largely depends on foreign direct 
investment.2 As TNCs became the agents of economic and social development, they also gained 
significant impact on the enjoyment of human rights in places of their operations. The rapid growth 
of global markets, which brought change in the distribution of power on the international field, 
however, has not been followed by equally fast globalisation of law and policy.3 The power of 
transnational business to influence, among other things, the enjoyment of human rights, is 
therefore not followed by corresponding responsibility. As the markets are international and the 
law is still principally national, the governance gap is yet to be filled.4  
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court was hearing arguments in the landmark case of 
Kiobel et al. v. Shell.5 Shell was accused of acts violating human rights of Nigerian nationals, 
including torture and extrajudicial killings. The counsel for Shell stated: ‘is there any source in 




1 Stephen J Korbin, ‘Globalization, transnational corporations and the future of global governance’ in Andreas G 
Scherer and Guido Palazzo (eds), Handbook of Research on Global Corporate Citizenship (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2008), p. 253. 
2 Ann-Sofie Isaksson and Andreas Kotsadam, ‘Racing to the bottom? Chinese development projects and trade union 
involvement in Africa’ [2018] World Development vol. 106, issue C, 284, p. 284; Menno T Kamminga and Saman 
Zia-Zarifi, Liability of Multinational Corporations Under International Law (Kluwer Law International 2000), p. 2; 
Pavel Šturma and Vladimír Balaš, Mezinárodní ekonomické parvo (2nd ed., C. H. Beck 2013), p. 137. 
3 ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, ‘A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities 
for All’ (International Labour Office 2004), p. xi. 
4 Korbin (supra note 1), p. 249; John G Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (W.W. 
Norton 2013), p. 7 in pdf; Beth Stephens, ‘The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights’ 
[2002] 20 Berkeley J. Int'l L., 45, p. 54. 




rights offenses alleged here? And the answer is there is none.’6 Indeed, so far there has been little 
success in holding TNCs to account under international law, customary and treaty-based alike. As 
international human rights law evolved in the context of the Westphalian system of sovereign 
states, it is also the states who had originally been under the obligation to respect human rights. 
As this system still forms the basis of international law today, the gap in regulation of TNCs with 
respect to human rights should, arguably, be overcome through national law. However, while it is 
states who have a general duty to protect human rights, including a duty to protect them against 
business-related abuses, they can, for many reasons, be unable or unwilling to do so. Due to the 
inability of international and national law to effectively address the instances of corporate acts 
which have adverse impacts on human rights, a considerable body of soft law gradually developed 
on the floor of international organisations. These instruments are encouraging businesses to accept 
their social responsibility. Although they do not contain legally binding rules, they create what the 
UN Special Representative for business and human rights, Professor John Ruggie, calls ‘social 
norms’.7 According to Ruggie, these social norms are capable of inducing change where lex lata 
is not available or is not being enforced.8 
The main objective of this paper is to explore why, after decades of discussions about the 
impact that transnational business has on human rights, gross business-related human rights 
violations are still happening and rarely are there any serious consequences for the perpetrator. 
This paper will examine the possible accountability mechanisms currently in theory offered in 
cases of adverse impacts of transnational business on human rights. The intention behind this 
endeavour is to identify why is responsibility of TNCs so difficult to achieve. While focusing on 
international law, consideration is also given to current alternatives to international regulation 
offered in the countries of the corporations’ operations as well as in the countries of their 
incorporation. Lastly, some focus is put on already existing soft law rules on corporate social 
responsibility and their potential to provide an effective alternative to binding instruments of 





6 Andrew Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations for Non-State-Actors: Where are We Now?’ in Fannie Lafontaine 
and François Larocque (eds), Doing Peace the Rights Way: Essays in International Law and Relations in Honour 
of Louise Arbour (Intersentia 2018), p.21. 
7 John G Ruggie, ‘The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ Corporate 
Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 67 (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 2017), 
p. 13. 





1.1. Research questions, methods and structure  
This paper is divided into four chapters, which all (except this Chapter 1) reflect one 
research question posed hereunder. Chapter 1 is dedicated to defining the research questions and 
delimiting the boundaries of research. It further provides definitions of the key terminology used 
in this thesis. Specifically, it elaborates on the term ‘transnational corporation’, the difference 
between ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ in international and national law and the concept of human 
rights in international law with special focus to human rights in relation to business.  
The need for an effective regulation of international business and human rights has been a 
topic resonating strongly in the international debate in the past three decades.9 In this regard, some 
have suggested that the obligations of states under existing international human rights law should 
be extended to TNCs.10 Others are advocating for a new binding international treaty that would 
impose direct human rights obligations upon corporations.11 Yet, many are of the view that TNCs 
should be held to account under national law and international law does not need to be directly 
engaged.12 Either way, the existence of such lively debate on this topic shows that there is a strong 
perception of a need for change. This paper was initially inspired by this debate and seeks to 
identify the gaps and loopholes in legal regulation to provide better understanding of which ways 
forward are feasible and under what circumstances. Chapter 2 is concerned with the duty of TNCs 
to respect human rights. It examines whether such obligation exist in lex lata public international 




9 John G Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (W.W. Norton 2013), p. 8 in pdf. 
10 Beth Stephens, ‘The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights’ [2002] 20 Berkeley J. Int'l 
L., 45, p. 73; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors (Oxford University Press 2006), pp. 
68-69; Karsten Nowrot, ‘New Approaches to the International Legal Personality of Multinational Corporations 
Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities’ <http://esil-sedi.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Nowrot.pdf> accessed 27 June 2019, pp. 7-11. 
11 UN Human Rights Council, Report on the third session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, 24 January 2018, 
A/HRC/37/67, para. 19; see also Peter T Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights and Multinationals: Is There a Problem?’ in 
David Kinley (ed), Human Rights and Corporations (Routledge 2017), p. 38; Connie de la Vega, ‘International 
Standards on Business and Human Rights: Is Drafting a New Treaty Worth It’ [2017] 51 U.S.F. L. Rev. 431, p. 468. 
12 The International Chamber of Commerce and the International Organisation of Employers, ‘Joint views of ICC and 
the IOE on the draft “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with regard to Human Rights” submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ (1 March 2004) 




What are the current obstacles to holding TNCs responsible for human rights abuses 
under public international law? 
In answering this question, Chapter 2 uses conceptual analysis of legal personality in public 
international law. It also provides comparative analysis of the status of corporations under both 
international human rights law and international criminal law. Moreover, it studies whether 
international criminal law is capable of providing the enforcement tool missing in international 
human rights law. 
Although the title of this paper is ‘Responsibility of Transnational Corporations for Human 
Rights Violations under International Law’, analysis of national accountability mechanisms is an 
important component of this paper. It is the shortcomings of national law that are used as an 
argument necessitating international regulation of TNCs. The research question reflected in 
Chapter 3 is therefore: 
Can TNCs be held accountable for human rights abuses on the national level? 
Accordingly, Chapter 3 focuses on the state duty to protect human rights and provide victims of 
human rights abuses with access to effective remedies. It seeks to describe why states are falling 
short of effectively preventing human rights abuses committed by TNCs. As to the access to 
remedy, Chapter 3 provides a comparative analysis of recent caselaw from selected common law 
and civil law jurisdictions to determine whether victims of transnational human rights abuse have 
effective recourse available to them.  
Lastly, the analysis of the relationship between business and human rights would not be 
complete without the evaluation of the most significant soft law instruments adopted by 
international organizations. Chapter 4 is descriptive in its character as it maps these selected soft 
law instruments, namely the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the United 
Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights. Ultimately, Chapter 4 aspires to 
answer the following: 
Can the accountability mechanisms offered by existing international soft law instruments 




1.2. Research limitations 
The topic of responsibility of transnational business for violations of human rights is 
potentially very broad and worthy of more space than this thesis can offer. This paper thus does 
not aim at covering all the aspects possibly connected to it. Firstly, it is not concerned with the 
possible attribution of the acts of TNCs to states under customary international rules, as laid down 
in the International Law Commissions’ Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). Some relevant conduct of corporations may be carried out in exercise 
of governmental authority, upon instructions, direction or control of a state, or acknowledged and 
adopted by a state and thus give rise to state responsibility. This thesis, however, focuses solely on 
the responsibility of the TNCs themselves, which may be triggered independently as well as 
parallelly to state responsibility. 
Secondly, it is not the aim of this paper to provide an in-depth analysis of the material 
content of different human rights obligations. The underlying concept of human rights is to be 
found in subsection 1.3.3. of this Chapter and the description of human rights specifically 
susceptible to infringement by TNCs is provided throughout this paper. As this paper examines 
consequences of such acts, i.e. responsibility and possibilities of holding TNCs to account for such 
violations, it is presumed that such responsibility would be triggered by behaviour of TNCs having 
severe negative impact on human rights as recognized in the various international covenants and 
treaties.  
Lastly, this paper does not examine the possible responsibility of TNCs for human rights 
violations stemming from international investment agreements. Although counterclaims in 
international investment arbitration may, in certain limited circumstances, offer a new forum for 
establishment of responsibility of TNCs for human rights violations, the procedural aspects of such 





13 Nikola Klímová, ‘Host-State Counterclaims in Investment Arbitration: Holding Investors Accountable for Human 





1.3.1. Characterization of transnational corporations 
Some scholars differentiate between multinational and transnational corporations, although 
the terms are frequently used interchangeably. The term ‘multinational corporation’ was first used 
in 1960 by David E Lilienthal.14 He defined multinational corporations as those ‘which have their 
home in one country but which operate and live under the laws and customs of other countries as 
well’.15 Economists such as Richard E Caves define a multinational enterprise as ‘an enterprise 
that controls and manages production establishments - plants - located in at least two countries’.16 
This definition, which bestows on multinational corporations a managerial control rather than just 
financial stake, indicates that multinational companies engage in foreign direct investment (as 
opposed to portfolio investments).17 With regard to nationality, multinational corporations are 
sometimes described as parent companies with one nationality having subsidiaries in multiple 
other countries.18  
A ‘transnational corporation’, on the other hand, could be distinguished by a higher level 
of decentralization.19 The United Nations defines it as:  
an economic entity operating in more than one country or a 
cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries 
- whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or 
country of activity, and whether taken individually or 
collectively.20 
Even the United Nations’ interpretation of the terms ‘multinational’ and ‘transnational’ has 




14 Peter T Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises & the Law (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2007), p. 5. 
15 David K Fieldhouse ‘The Multinational: A Critique of a Concept’ in Alice Teichova et al. (eds), Multinational 
Enterprises in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press 1986) 10; Muchlinski (supra note 14), p. 5. 
16 Richard E Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge University Press 1982), p. 1; see 
also Neil Hood and Stephen Young, The Economics of the Multinational Enterprise (Longman 1979), p. 3. 
17 Muchlinski (supra note 14), p. 5. 
18 Pavel Šturma and Vladimír Balaš, Mezinárodní ekonomické právo (2nd ed., C. H. Beck 2013), p. 137. 
19 Ibid.; see also Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Transnational” in Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier (eds), The Palgrave 
Dictionary of Transnational History (Palgrave Macmillan UK 2009), p. 1051. 
20 Un Sub-Commission on The Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (55th Session) Agenda item 4, ‘Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 




term ‘transnational corporation’ is used to cover all types and forms of cross-border enterprises.21 
What seems to be the main indicator of a transnational corporation is the ability of the entity in 
question to coordinate business activities between enterprises in more countries.22  
The reason why TNCs deserve special attention and regulation distinct from domestic 
companies is, according to Muchlinski, that they create different problems in economic policy. 
The causes of the different policy issues are hidden in the fact that TNCs have the ability to 
distribute production across borders, utilize their know-how in foreign markets through their 
affiliates without having to sell it and the ability to organize their managerial structure on a global 
level.23 With respect to human rights, TNCs have a specific position due to their immense market 
power. As further elaborated in Chapter 3 below, TNCs have dominated the foreign direct 
investment worldwide24 and thus may significantly influence the enjoyment of certain human 
rights25 as well as the local regulatory standards.26 That applies to developing and developed 
countries, although developing countries are arguably more vulnerable as they depend on TNCs’ 
investment capital. This factor is coupled with problems with uncovering the corporate structure, 
which may be spread across jurisdictions with differing corporate law regulations. Therefore, when 
a TNC is implicated in human rights abuses, the corporate veil reinforced by its transnationality 
poses a potential obstacle to finding the true perpetrator and providing the victims with access to 
judicial remedies. In light of these distinct problems created or augmented by the transnationality 
of TNCs and the resulting need for a distinct targeted regulation, this paper focuses specifically on 
TNCs rather than any and all business corporations.  
Ultimately, however, drawing the line of where a TNC ends is bound to encompass some 
arbitrariness.27 For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘transnational corporation’ is intended to 




21 Muchlinski (supra note 14), p. 6. 
22 Luigi Chiarella, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Companies: Responsibility without Accountability’ [2014] 
4 Bocconi Legal Papers 185, p. 187. 
23 Muchlinski (supra note 14), p. 8. 
24 Larissa van den Herik and Jernej L Černič, ‘Regulating Corporations under International Law’ [2010] 8 J Int'l Crim 
Just 725, pp. 725-726. 
25 Predominantly labour rights, rights connected to the environment or rights of indigenous peoples, see section 1.3.3. 
below. 
26 See pp. 34-35 below. 




in more than one country at a time. Such entity’s model may range from a very decentralized TNC 
which consists of relatively self-sufficient companies operating in different host countries, to an 
entity centred around one parent in a home country, with uniform business strategy in all of its 
host countries. What unites these types of TNCs is their transnationality as to their operations, 
customer base and/or supply chains.28 The differences in governance structures are, in the end, not 
as significant when considering potential human rights obligations of such entities, as they would 
be for other considerations.29 
1.3.2. Responsibility and liability  
Differentiating between ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ is specific to English language, as 
other languages offer only one word for both.30 International responsibility, moreover, is 
distinctive, not identical to responsibility in national law.31 It is therefore necessary to provide a 
short explanation of these terms at this point, as this thesis describes responsibility and liability in 
both the national and the international context. 
International responsibility of states is neither of purely criminal, nor civil nature32 as it 
combines elements of both. It aims to both satisfy the injured party and to sanction the perpetrator 
in favour of the international community as a whole.33 Although the concept of international 
responsibility used to be inseparably connected to an obligation of reparation of damage,34 this 
approach seems to have been abandoned. The currently most accepted definition of international 




28 Denis G Arnold, ‘Corporations and Human Rights Obligations’ [2016] Business and Human Rights Journal, vol. 1, 
255, p. 257. 
29 Ibid. 
30 E.g. French (‘responsabilité’), Spanish (‘responsabilidad’), Italian (‘responsabilità’), Czech (‘odpovědnost’). 
31 Alain Pellet ‘The Definition of Responsibility in International Law’ in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon 
Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2010), p. 3. 
32 Pellet (supra note 31), p. 13; see also Roberto Ago, Third Report on Stare Responsibiliry ‘The internationally 
wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility’ in ILC Yearbook 1971, Vol. II pt. 1, 199, p. 209, 
para 38. 
33 Pellet (supra note 31), pp. 13-14. 




act.35 Article 1 ARSIWA states that: ‘Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State.’ State responsibility therefore arises when there is an act 
attributable to the state which breaches the state’s international obligation.36 It follows that damage 
is no longer a conditio sine qua non of international responsibility.37 Moreover, responsibility of 
states for internationally wrongful acts must be distinguished from responsibility under 
international criminal law. Although some acts may trigger both of these consequences, they are 
each breaching a different legal obligation.38 Even the ICJ recognized that this ‘duality of 
responsibility continues to be a constant feature of international law.’39 
Liability in international law refers to strict liability, which arises from a harmful 
consequence of an act not prohibited by norms of public international law, but potentially 
dangerous.40 It can be established by an international treaty,41 or result from an international 
principle.42  Unlike in the above described case of international responsibility of states, existence 
of damage (together with risk) is a necessary precondition of the sine delicto liability.43 It remains 
to be mentioned that events giving rise to liability are rare also because when there is a 
simultaneous state obligation of prevention, breaching such obligation results in responsibility.  
Turning to the meaning of ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ in domestic law, the Anglo-
American legal language does not draw a line nearly as strict as is drawn in public international 
law. To the contrary, the words are at many times used interchangeably. As Sir Salmond describes: 




35 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries [2001] Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, vol. II, Part Two (United Nations 
2008), p. 31 para 1. 
36 see International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts as adopted 
by the UN General Assembly Res. 56/83, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts (28 January 
2002), A/RES/56/83, Art. 2. 
37 Pellet (supra note 31), p. 9.  
38 Roger O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (1st ed., Oxford University Press 2015), p. 79. 
39 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro]), Judgment, ICJ Rep. 2007, 43, para 173. 
40 Pellet (supra note 31), p. 10. 
41 e.g. Article VII of The Convention on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 601 U.N.T.S. 205. 
42 Pellet (supra note 31), p. 10. 




remedy of the wrong.’44 The Black’s Law Dictionary defines liability as ‘legal responsibility to 
another or to society, enforceable by civil remedy or criminal punishment’.45 The only subtle 
difference that can be inferred from this definition is that ‘responsibility’ is a broader term, not 
limited to legal context, while ‘liability’ is its legal subcategory. Accordingly, ‘responsibility’ is 
defined as ‘being duty-bound’,46 while ‘liability’ is defined as ‘being legally obligated’.47 
Moreover, the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights discussed in 
Chapter 3 below use the term ‘corporate responsibility’ to respect human rights. According to the 
author, Professor Ruggie, the term ‘responsibility’ was used intentionally to indicate a broader 
normative framework.48 Specifically, it was chosen to signal that the duties in question stem not 
only from legal norms, but also from social norms, i.e. the ‘nonstate-based social or civil system 
grounded in the relations between corporations and their external stakeholders’.49 
This paper follows this delimitation of the two terms. When discussing responsibility under 
public international law, it adheres strictly to the terminology used by the International Law 
Commission in ARSIWA. Conversely, when referring to domestic law and civil liability lawsuits, 
it is more benevolent with the terms, preferring the use of the term liability as a legal subcategory 
of responsibility. Lastly, when discussing the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human 
Rights, the terminology chosen therein is followed in this paper. 
1.3.3. The concept of human rights and its relation to business operations 
The concept of human rights has its firm roots in Christian morality and social practices.50 
This paper, however, aims at a legal analysis and therefore approaches the concept from a positivist 
legal perspective. Even so, it is hard to clearly define human rights. The scope of human rights in 




44 John W Salmond and Glanville L Williams, Salmond on Jurisprudence (10th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1947), p. 396. 
45 ‘liability’ in Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed., Thomson Reuters 2019). 
46 ‘responsibility’ in Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed., Thomson Reuters 2019). 
47 ‘liability’ in Bryan A Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed., Thomson Reuters 2019). 
48 John G Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (W.W. Norton 2013), pp. 97-98 in 
pdf. 
49 Ibid., p. 97 in pdf. 




a consensus on a clear unambiguous definition difficult.51 Nonetheless, deriving from the varied 
legal doctrine and practice, Tomuschat finds a common denominator in that ‘[h]uman rights are 
rights intimately connected to human existence in dignity and freedom.’52  
In positive law, ‘[i]nternational human rights are those human needs that have received 
formal recognition as rights through the sources of international law’.53 Therefore, international 
human rights can be identified by analysing international human rights instruments.54 The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) unanimously adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1948 to prevent a recurrence of the atrocities of the Second World War in its thirty 
articles proclaims a variety of rights, ranging from the right to life, liberty and security of person55 
to the right to education,56 or the right to participate in the cultural life of the community.57 Since 
the adoption of the UDHR, international covenants and treaties have significantly broadened the 
catalogue, giving rise to two major categories: the civil and political rights and socio-economic 
rights.58  
Civil and political rights, i.e. the first two generations of human rights, found their 
codification in the ICCPR. The ICCPR contains provisions unifying the human rights standards 
on the international level, containing provisions on rights such as the right to a fair trial59 or the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.60 . There are, however, certain rights contained in the 
ICCPR, which are stemming from ius cogens and are only solidified by the ICCPR. Specifically, 




51 Lucy Kronforst ‘Transnational Corporations and Human Rights Violations: Focus on Colombia’ [2005] 23 Wis. 
Int'l L.J. 321, p. 322; for example in the field of sexual and reproductive health and rights, which are promoted by 
the EU as human rights, there is a strong backlash by the US, Brazil, Russian Federation and many other states. 
52 Tomuschat (supra note 50), p. 4. 
53 Stephen Marks, ‘Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?’ [1981] 33 Rutgers Law Review 435, 
p. 436. 
54 Marc Bossuyt, International Human Rights Protection: Balanced, Critical, Realistic (Intersentia 2016), p. 8. 
55 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR), Art 3. 
56 Ibid., Art 26. 
57 Ibid., Art 27(1). 
58 Bossuyt (supra note 54), p. 8. 
59 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 
999 U.N.T.S. 171., Art 14. 
60 Ibid., Art 18. 




treatment or punishment62 and slavery and servitude63).64 The economic, social and cultural rights 
were codified in the ICESCR. Contrary to the ICCPR, the ICESCR is of a rather proclamatory 
nature, leaving its implementation upon states and having in mind their differing economic 
capacities.65 These proclamatory provisions contain, for example, the right to employment66 and 
health.67 Some rights are, nonetheless, formulated as specific obligations of states. These include 
for example the obligation to ensure the right to form and join trade unions,68 or to criminally 
prosecute child labour69.70  
It must also be noted that there are human rights which are as to their existence, or at least 
as to their extent, disputable. For instance, the right to a healthy environment, although 
increasingly acknowledged, has not been included in any universal human rights treaty or 
declaration.71 Nonetheless, UN treaty bodies, regional tribunals and other human rights 
mechanisms have viewed environmental issues through a human rights lens.72  
When linking human rights to business, defining the scope of human rights does not get 
any easier. While drafting the UN General Principles on Business and Human Rights, Professor 
Ruggie opted to refer to ‘internationally recognized human rights’ as the rights which must be 




62 Ibid., Art 7. 
63 Ibid., Art 8. 
64 Čestmír Čepelka and Pavel Šturma, Mezinárodní parvo veřejné (1st ed., C. H. Beck 2008), pp. 408-409. 
65 Ibid., p. 407. 
66 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 
January 1976) 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Art 7. 
67 Ibid., Art 12. 
68 Ibid., Art 8. 
69 Ibid., Art 10(3). 
70 Čepelka and Šturma (supra note 64), p. 704. 
71 John H Knox and Ramin Pejan, The Human Right to a Healthy Environment (Cambridge University Press 2018), 
pp. 1-2. 
72 Ibid., p. 2. 
73 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John G Ruggie, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (21 March 2011), A/HRC/17/31, 




those [human rights] expressed in the International Bill of 
Human Rights74 and the principles concerning fundamental 
rights set out in the International Labour Organization’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.75 
Ruggie, however, went beyond this minimal benchmark and suggested that, depending on 
the circumstances, business enterprises may need to take into account additional standards, such 
as the rights of indigenous peoples, women, national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
children, persons with disabilities and migrant workers and their families.76 Additionally, 
corporations operating in conflict zones should respect the standards of international humanitarian 
law.77 
In practice, human rights potentially susceptible to corporate abuse include both civil and 
political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Considering the most common mode of 
operation of TNCs, some of the most adversely impacted human rights fall in the category of 
labour rights.78 These abuses may include the use of forced and child labour, violations of the right 
to associate and form unions as well as  poor safety and health conditions at the workplace. Also 
common on the list of corporate wrongdoings is environmental damage79 and the associated land-
grabbing and the displacement of indigenous peoples. TNCs have also been implicated in 
supporting governments that violate human rights of their own citizens.80  
This paper does not aim at extensive analysis of the material content of individual human 
rights potentially susceptible to corporate abuse. Rather, the focus of this thesis is put on the 
consequence of such abuse, i.e. responsibility of TNCs. Unless further specified otherwise, it is 
therefore presumed that such responsibility would be triggered by an act or omission, which has 
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2. Obstacles to direct responsibility of transnational corporations under public 
international law 
To understand why TNCs cannot de lege lata bear human rights obligations under 
international law, the notion of international legal personality must firstly be examined. 
International law is specific in this regard, as it has no centralized law of persons.81 The 
specification of legal personality in international law is therefore inferred from considerations of 
the nature of international law and the role states and other entities play in it.82 This concept of 
legal personality (or international personality) may be traced to the second half of the nineteenth 
century83 and refers to ‘the capacity to be the bearer of rights and duties under international law’.84 
This approach to legal personality in international law, dominant in legal theory,85 therefore gives 
subjects of international law certain ability to carry rights and obligations and also to bring claims 
in order to maintain these rights. Under the traditional positivist doctrine, subjects of international 
law are individual sovereign states.86 They are the ‘traditional’ subjects of international law 
because they have been the principal actors on the international scene from the very beginning.87  
The more recent state of affairs on the international scene, however, requires other actors 
to be given the capacity to bear international rights and obligations, albeit in a limited manner. 
According to established doctrine, international legal personality requires a sort of wide 
acceptance in the form of conferral of rights and obligations by states under international law.88 
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national law.89 Entities widely accepted by states to have limited international legal subjectivity 
include international organizations,90 entities legally proximate to states,91 some sui generis 
entities92 or peoples with a right to self-determination.93  Even natural persons are given 
international subjectivity in so far as they enjoy protection of human rights or of their 
investments,94 or when they face international criminal culpability.95  
When it comes to TNCs, their significant influence on contemporary international affairs 
can hardly be overlooked. Nonetheless, treating them as subjects of public international law is a 
controversial issue.96 To clarify, there is little controversy surrounding the capacity of corporations 
to bear certain rights under international law, such as rights stemming from international 
investment agreements or the right to a fair trial and property rights.97 When it comes to 
obligations, however, there is not much evidence to support claims of already existing and fully 
developed international legal personality of corporations.98 Nevertheless, certain recent 
developments suggest that there might be potential for change.99  This Chapter examines the 
capacity (or rather lack thereof) of TNCs to be responsible for human rights abuses under both 
international human rights treaty law and international criminal law. This Chapter, moreover, 
describes recent developments in international field which indicate the willingness of some states 
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2.1. Corporations as subjects of international human rights treaty law 
Most human rights have their origin in international treaties.100 Contrary to customary 
norms of international criminal law, international treaties are not focused on imposing duties on 
individuals. Rather, they are designed to protect their rights.101 Where such treaties establish 
mechanisms of review, the aggrieved individual has a direct right to file for remedy without the 
involvement of the home state.102 In such capacity, the legal personality of an individual is hardly 
disputed. Questions, however, arise as to the range of subjects bound by the international human 
rights treaties. For a long time, the one dominant threat to individual beings was the state.103 Up 
until the end of the Second World War when the United Nations was founded and its human rights 
protections were established, nation-states had only few rivals.104 Therefore, the explicit mentions 
of duties of non-state actors, if any, are somewhat sporadic and inconsistent. 
For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘[e]veryone has duties 
to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.’105 
Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR have included a statement in their preambles ‘[r]ealizing that 
the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is 
under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized’ in the 
respective Covenant.106 
The regional human rights regimes are also very inconsistent on this issue. The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is the most exhaustive, containing an entire chapter titled 
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whole. The American Convention on Human Rights simply states that ‘[e]very person has 
responsibilities to his family, his community, and mankind.’108 The ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration notes that ‘all rights must be balanced with the performance of corresponding 
duties[...]’109 and finally the European ECHR is silent as to any duties of individuals,110 possibly 
due to its nearly 70 years of age. All these provisions, however, are very broad and thus not 
realistically enforceable. As Professor Tomuschat notes, they are rather political statements 
reminding everyone that the community rests on the voluntary cooperation of individuals.111 
2.2. Possibility of redesigning the approach to business and human rights  
As described in the previous section, corporations are not endowed with legal personality 
under international human rights law and cannot, under the current paradigm, be responsible for 
not respecting human rights of others. The leading argument in favour of redesigning this current 
approach to international legal personality seems to be that international law should reflect the 
needs of the community.112 This follows from the fact that the sole existence of international law 
is to ensure stability and peace113 as a communal interest. In order to achieve this goal, the law 
needs to remain ‘effective’114 and ‘realistic’.115 As power is no longer vested exclusively in 
individual states, international law must adjust to these changes. Professor Charney explains: 
‘Nation-states aside, TNCs are the most powerful actors in the world today and to not recognize 
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pragmatism’ and introduce positive legal obligations to observe fundamental human rights into 
international treaties addressed directly to TNCs.117  
This appeal to rethink the approach to corporate human rights obligations is not coming 
only from the academic circles. In terms of global developments towards corporate responsibility 
in international human rights law, the most significant one came in 2014 from the initiative of 
Ecuador and South Africa on the floor of the UN Human Rights Council. The Council established 
the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) with a mandate ‘to elaborate an 
international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.’118 This effort of certain 
states to achieve regulation of TNCs is the last one of many such efforts119 and is supported mainly 
by countries of the Global South. Since the establishment of the OEIGWG, a ‘Zero Draft’ of the 
proposed treaty on business and human rights120 has been published and regularly updated by its 
chairperson, most recently in July 2019.121  
The proposed Zero Draft is a very novel concept. It proposes a treaty, which would include 
obligations of both states and business enterprises. Although the wording of the Zero Draft would 
impose the obligation to respect human rights upon TNCs, it is still mainly focused on states. It is 
either worded passively, stating that ‘victims shall’ be treated in a certain way, be protected etc, or 
that ‘victims shall be guaranteed’ something.122 Conversely, when establishing obligations 
explicitly directed at states, the Zero Draft is relatively clear. It, for example, provides that states 
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to victims.124 Emphasis is also put on the state obligation of prevention.125 The Zero Draft also 
distinguishes between ‘violations’ of human rights by states and ‘abuse’ of human rights by 
business.126  
What seem problematic is, however, the exact scope of the proposed obligations. The Zero 
Draft simply states that ‘[t]his (Legally Binding Instrument) shall cover all human rights.’127 It is, 
however, not clear which human rights are ‘all human rights’. Some rights have not been 
recognized as human rights by all states128 and some treaties have not been ratified by all states,129 
leaving the proposed scope of the treaty very ambiguous. Although the proposed Preamble of the 
Zero Draft recalls ‘nine core International Human Rights Instruments adopted by the United 
Nations, and the eight fundamental Conventions adopted by the International Labour 
Organization’,130 it was criticized as not all states chose to ratify these instruments.131 The Zero 
Draft then defines ‘human rights violations or abuse’ as:  
any harm committed by a State or a business enterprise, 
through acts or omissions in the context of business activities, 
against any person or group of persons, individually or 
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suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their 
human rights, including environmental rights.132 
This broad formulation provoked some states and business organizations to suggest that such 
vague definition might conflict with the principle of legality.133 Moreover, in terms of enforcement 
of the proposed treaty, the Zero Draft currently assigns adjudicative jurisdiction over future 
violations of the proposed treaty to national courts.134 In absence of any clear definitions, the 
interpretation of the treaty would therefore be in the hands of national courts, who can potentially 
weaken its intended protections. 
Although the drafting of the proposed treaty on business and human rights gave hope to 
both victims and the civil society, the drafters will have to strike a balance between two conflicting 
tendencies. If the treaty ends up being too progressive and complex, many states will likely not be 
interested in becoming a party. Especially considering that even the aforementioned resolution of 
the Human Rights Council which established the OEIGWG was voted against by the US, Japan 
and the EU member states, countries in which the majority of TNCs is headquartered.135 Moreover, 
some Western countries continue to oppose the drafting process and do not engage in the 
negotiations.136 The US, for example, view the Zero Draft as a departure from the agreed 
framework in the UN GPs, which ‘were painstakingly crafted to avoid the unworkable approach 
represented by the draft treaty’.137 The strong opposition to the new treaty among the home states 
of TNCs indicates that even if the treaty comes to life, it might not be ratified by many states.138 
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participate, it will face the danger of becoming a mere proclamation, too abstract and not reflective 
of the diversity of all the relevant stakeholders.139 
In conclusion, although neither TNCs nor other corporations can be de lege lata responsible 
for violations of human rights under human rights treaty law, there are growing tendencies for 
rethinking this approach. These tendencies are fuelled by the changing allocation of power in the 
world. Considering that international legal personality can be granted to entities by wide 
acceptance in the form of conferral of rights and obligations by states under international law, an 
international treaty could serve as the appropriate tool. However, as the negotiations currently 
under way in the OEIGWG show, the drafters will have to strike a delicate equilibrium. In order 
for the treaty to gain sufficient support, it will have to accommodate the suggestions of states which 
are home to the majority of TNCs. On the other hand, the treaty will also need to retain some 
normative power and not be diluted to an ineffective proclamation. 
2.3. Enforcing corporate responsibility through international criminal law 
As explained in the previous subsection, subjects of international human rights treaty law 
are states and direct obligations of non-state actors in this field are not well established. To the 
contrary, there is no doubt that non-state actors are subjects of international criminal law, while 
states are excluded from its scope.140 Moreover, international criminal law is less problematic 
when it comes to extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.141 Therefore, international criminal law 
has been in the centre of attention of those who suggest that it could provide the missing 
enforcement tool for corporate human rights abuses.142 This assumption, however, faces two major 
problems. First, it is contentious whether the applicability of customary norms, which paved the 
way for direct individual responsibility, could be extended to corporations. Second, the scope of 
international criminal law is limited only to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole, leaving many (if not most) instances of corporate human rights violations 
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2.3.1. Prosecuting corporations for international crimes 
Turning to the first problem, already the Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal restricted the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction to natural persons.143 The Nuremberg Tribunal stated that ‘crimes against 
international law are committed by men, not abstract entities[...].’144 This approach to limit 
jurisdiction to natural persons was then followed when establishing other international criminal 
tribunals.145 Interestingly, the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court show that the drafters considered extending the ICC’s jurisdiction to 
corporations.146 Among the soundest arguments against this extension was the fact that corporate 
criminal liability is by no means universal to all jurisdictions.147 In the end, therefore, the Rome 
Statute provides that ‘[t]he Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this 
Statute.’148 The fact that the inclusion of private legal persons was so explicitly rejected in case of 
the Rome Statute only strengthens the argument that there is no sufficient intention and/or will to 
impose obligations onto corporations.  
Nonetheless, the ICC could in theory prosecute individual company executives involved in 
international criminal behaviour. Such prosecution is, however, not at all common or readily 
available. The ICC will generally only deal with individual criminal liability of corporate officers 
in cases where their actions fall in the scope of a complex criminal case referred to the ICC by a 
state party or the UN Security Council or which is investigated by the Prosecutor proprio motu.149 
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corporations will not be exposed to the danger of ICC investigations.150 Moreover, the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is limited on personal, geographical and temporal basis. It can be exercised only over 
nationals of a state party to the Rome Statute, or over a crime committed on the territory of a state 
party no sooner than on 1 July 2002.151 Since the US and Russia withdrew their signatures from 
the Rome Statute, some signatories have not yet ratified it and China, India, many Southeast Asian 
states and some African states are not signatory at all,152 the ICC jurisdiction is nowhere near 
universal. On top of these jurisdictional restrictions, an issue of admissibility arises due to the fact 
that the ICC is an ultima ratio forum, only available in cases where the state party is unwilling or 
unable to prosecute the crime.153 Due to all of these factors, the ICC cannot function as a forum 
for enforcement of corporate human rights obligations and will only rarely prosecute corporate 
officers for international crimes. 
On the other hand, an opposite tendency on the issue of jurisdiction over legal persons can 
also be observed, albeit mostly on regional level. In 2014, the African Union adopted the Malabo 
Protocol, which extends jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to 
transnational crimes under international law.154 This newly broadened jurisdiction covers 
corporate criminal responsibility,155 extending the applicability of international criminal law to 
corporations.156 As Clapham notes, this development might be considered by some as a ‘regional 
anomaly’.157 It is, nonetheless, a notable development. As described above, states have the power 
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imposing obligations onto them.158 In this context, the Malabo Protocol is a very significant 
indicator that at least some states are, in principle, willing to recognize corporations as subjects of 
international criminal law. Moreover, as a panel of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon observed in 
its 2014 decision, ‘corporate criminal liability is on the verge of attaining, at the very least, the 
status of a general principle of law applicable under international law.’159 
2.3.2. Limited intersection between international crimes and human rights 
Second problem of designating international criminal law as a tool for enforcement of 
responsibility for human rights violations is that even if international criminal responsibility was 
extended to corporations, it would cover only the most severe of crimes. The majority of human 
rights susceptible to corporate abuse would thus remain without adequate protection.160 Customary 
norms directly imposing international obligations upon individuals evolved from armed 
conflicts.161 Some peacetime offences such as crimes against humanity (e.g. murder, enslavement, 
torture, rape),162 genocide and aggression are also punishable under customary international law163 
and have been codified in, for example, the Rome Statute of the ICC. Some of these crimes are 
clearly directed at, among others, the rights to life and personal integrity164 and therefore share 
values with international human rights law.  
In terms of TNCs, such norms could be relevant as private businesses, especially military 
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international crimes, particularly in the conflict zones.165 There, they may aid the conflict by 
providing goods (e.g. weapons) and illicit funds, or military and security services.166 Other TNCs, 
such as oil, gas and mining corporations are also a relatively frequent culprit.167 A TNC may 
engage in internationally relevant criminal behaviour in different ways. It can get involved with 
military regimes and authoritarian governments. In such cases a TNC will either profit from human 
rights violations committed by the state, aid and abet crimes of the state by providing necessary 
means, or it will directly cooperate with the regime in carrying out the criminal acts.168 This was 
allegedly the case of, for example, the activities of Unocal169 in Myanmar. In the 1990s, Unocal 
was constructing a pipeline in Myanmar, a military dictatorship with poor human rights record. 
The construction was allegedly tainted by forced labour, rape, torture and murder committed by 
the military to the profit of and on behalf of Unocal. Although Unocal eventually settled this case 
with the victims out of court, US courts suggested that it did aid and abet the crimes of the military 
in Myanmar.170  
However, most consequences of the operations of TNCs which are harmful to human rights 
will probably not appear in conflict zones or in relation to dictatorships, but rather in the 
rainforests, mines, factories and warehouses. In this context, the crime against humanity is of 
special interest and some debate is evolving around its scope. This category of international crimes 
undoubtedly encompasses crimes like murder, extermination, enslavement, torture and rape, 
however only when these acts occur in ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population.’171 These crimes are all listed for example in Article 7 of the Rome Statute and Article 
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against humanity are somewhat open-ended, ending the listing with ‘or other inhumane acts.’173 
Thus, many victims of land-grabbing and the vast ecological destruction in the Amazon, for 
example, as well as a number of civil society organizations suggest that the crime of ‘ecocide’ 
should be recognized as a crime against humanity.174 There is, however, no agreement on a 
definition of the crime of ecocide or other ecological crime.175 As international criminal law is 
governed by the principle of legality reflected in the maxim of nullum crimen sine lege,176 a clear 
obligation must exist to establish criminal responsibility for its breach. Therefore, the crime of 
ecocide or any other addition to the catalogue of crimes against humanity would require state 
practice and opinio iuris sufficient to form a new customary norm.177 Even if, however, some 
instances of extensive environmental damage were eventually recognized as crimes against 
humanity, most human rights violations related to environmental damage would not be falling 
under this category, as the damage would not reach the scope or intensity required by the possible 
definition of ecocide. Thus, isolated crimes happening outside war or a broader ‘widespread and 
systematic’ action would still be governed by national law.178 
In conclusion, TNCs are currently not under an obligation to respect human rights, as they 
have not yet been recognized by states to have international legal personality in this regard. 
Therefore, neither human rights treaties, nor international customary norms are directly binding 
upon them.179 Moreover, even if legal persons were recognized as subjects of international criminal 
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they would not reach the intensity required for international crimes.180 Therefore, although 
potentially useful in certain limited cases, international criminal law cannot substitute enforcement 
mechanisms missing in international human rights law. From this perspective, the negotiations of 
the Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises is a promising development. The 
drafters of this instrument, however, face a difficult task of achieving compromise acceptable for 
as many states as possible, while avoiding excessive softening of its provisions. Only time will tell 
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3. Obstacles to holding transnational corporations accountable on the national level 
As noted by Muchlinski, there is no positive duty for private individuals, including 
corporations, to observe human rights.181 They are only obligated to obey the national law.182 
Under international human rights law, it is the individual sovereign states who are under an 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil.183 Although the scope of state responsibility to protect 
(‘R2P’ in the narrower sense) will not include any and all rights recognized in international treaties, 
it without a doubt covers basic human rights such as right to life, bodily integrity, or basic nutrition 
and health.184 In broader sense, states undertake to protect human rights in individual covenants 
and treaties, when they undertake to ‘ensure’ or ‘secure’ the rights contained in that treaty to 
everyone within their jurisdiction.185 This Chapter deals with state duty to protect individuals from 
third parties violating their human rights in this broader sense. 
In relation to business, the duty to protect is essential, as it entails the state duty to protect 
individuals from human rights abuse by third parties, including business corporations.186 The duty 
to protect is realized by states within their sovereign jurisdiction, which may be divided into 
jurisdiction to regulate, adjudicate, and enforce.187 The territorial scope of such jurisdiction, 
however, is limited by multiple factors. Coupled with inability or unwillingness of some states to 
protect human rights according to international standards, the territorial limitation of the duty to 
protect potentially forms a serious obstacle to holding transnational business accountable. 
Additionally, an important component of the state duty to protect against business-related 
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many states have not been willing or able to respond to the rise in power of transnational business 
by providing adequate and effective means of redress.189 For a multitude of reasons, victims of 
human rights violations are much too often left with no possibility for remedy, or have their access 
to justice excessively burdened. Common obstacles include legal reasons, such as corporate law 
limitations to liability, political reasons, such as corruption, and factual reasons, such as lack of 
expertise of courts.190  
This Chapter examines ways in which the state duty to protect falls short of preventing 
human rights abuses by transnational business, especially in developing countries. First, it 
examines the limitations of states’ prescriptive jurisdiction. Second, it analyses political and 
economic obstacles which may hinder holding transnational business to account. Third, it 
describes limits of the adjudicative jurisdiction of developed countries’ courts, including corporate 
law obstacles to an effective access to remedy on national level. While doing so, it provides 
practical examples of the difficulties facing victims of transnational business. 
3.1. Limited territorial scope of state duty to protect  
National law is ‘the principal jurisdiction’ for legal regulation of TNCs.191 The state duty 
to protect individuals from human rights violations forms the first pillar of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights and requires states to take ‘appropriate’ steps, which 
may include policy, legislative, administrative or judicial measures.192 In case of TNCs, which are 
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state jurisdiction arises. Stemming from their sovereignty under public international law, states 
have original ‘prescriptive’ jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of individuals through national 
law.193 This authority is, however, limited by the corresponding rights of other states.194 Therefore, 
state jurisdiction is, in its essence, territorial and ‘the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction is the 
exception that makes the norm’.195 These exceptions that allow states to regulate beyond national 
borders are most prominent in criminal law. They include personal jurisdiction, where a state may 
regulate conduct of its nationals without being limited by its borders, or protect its nationals 
abroad.196 Muchlinski suggests that states can, on the basis of the nationality link, require their 
domiciled companies to order their foreign subsidiaries to comply with that state’s domestic law.197 
Arguably, however, such act would not even be considered as extraterritorial exercise of 
jurisdiction.198 Moreover, under the protective principle, a state may have jurisdiction over the 
conduct that threatens its national security. Lastly, the principle of universality allows states to 
assert jurisdiction over most severe crimes against international law, which harm the whole 
international community.199  
The term ‘jurisdiction’ is essential not only to determine whether a state has the right to 
regulate, it is also crucial when determining the scope of state obligations under international 
human rights treaties.200 Different human rights treaties vary in how they delimit their 
applicability, however, they usually tie it to jurisdiction in some way. For example, under the 
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jurisdiction’.201 According to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the contracting states ‘shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined [in the Convention].’202 Similarly, the American Convention on 
Human Rights obligates contracting states to ‘ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the 
free and full exercise’ of their human rights.203 Generally, the term ‘jurisdiction’ in these 
provisions is understood to indicate that the duty to protect human rights is primarily territorial, 
because it would be unreasonable to require states to secure human rights for people outside of 
their reach.204 Nonetheless, there are some relatively well-established exceptions from the 
territorial delimitation of applicability of human rights treaties. First, a state has human rights 
obligations with respect to a territory over which it exercises effective control, for example in cases 
of military occupation.205 Moreover, jurisdiction may arise through effective personal control over 
an individual. This requires a specific physical or legal relationship in which a state agent acts as 
an authority over a specific individual.206 
A distinction, however, needs to be made between an extraterritorial obligation to respect 
human rights under a treaty and the territorial reach of state duty to protect.207 With regard to the 
latter, as De Schutter noted in 2006, a clear obligation of states under international law to control 
individuals, including corporations ‘operating outside their national territory, in order to ensure 
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Similarly, Professor Ruggie, the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, 
commented in his final 2011 report as follows: 
At present States are not generally required under 
international human rights law to regulate the extraterritorial 
activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction. Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, 
provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.209 
De Schutter, nonetheless, argues that this approach is changing, citing various soft law 
instruments.210 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as other human 
rights treaty bodies have stressed the importance of extraterritorial prevention.211 For example, the 
CESCR’s General Comment no. 14 states that: 
To comply with their international obligations in relation to 
article 12 [of the ICESCR], States parties have to […] prevent 
third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they 
are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or 
political means […].212 
This view was also endorsed and further refined by a number of human rights experts in 
the Maastricht Principles.213 This instrument was drafted with an ambition to ‘contribute to filling 
the normative and accountability gap resulting from processes of globalization’,214 and clearly 
defining the normative framework, which is shaping up in the CESCR’s general comments.215 
Perhaps most significant regarding transnational business is Principle 25(c), which provides for a 
state obligation to adopt and enforce legal and other means to protect economic, social and cultural 
rights when a corporation, its parent or a controlling company ‘has its centre of activity, is 
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State concerned.’216 This principle seems to reflect another argument of some scholars that the 
extraterritoriality of the duty to protect human rights can be inferred by analogy from the 
customary international law rule of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, i.e. the ‘no harm rule’.217 
This principle of international environmental law formulated in Trail Smelter arbitration prohibits 
states to allow the use of their territory in a way that would cause injury in another state.218 
However, there is no practice of human rights courts and committees to support the extension of 
the no harm rule to human rights.219 Either way, De Schutter predicts the Maastricht Principles to 
help the development of case law ‘further strengthening the evolution towards the recognition of 
human rights extra-territorial obligations…’.220  
In spite of these developments towards a clearer obligation of states to protect human rights 
beyond their borders, most states do not accept this notion.221 Where there is no such obligation 
explicitly expressed in a human rights treaty, the states have not agreed to be bound in such 
extent.222 Therefore, the current status quo of international law seems to favour the interpretation 
offered by Ruggie that states are not under a general obligation to regulate business activities 
relevant for protection of human rights extraterritorially, however, they may do so where they have 
the prescriptive jurisdiction.223  
3.2. Economic and political obstacles 
Sometimes, economic and political reasons form another obstacle to achieving effective 
national law accountability mechanisms for TNCs in both the host states and the home states. The 
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as well as formation of national and international economic policy.224 For example, the TRIPS 
Agreement,225 which is binding in 164 countries, was essentially developed by twelve chief 
executive officers of pharmaceutical, entertainment and software industries.226  
The economic power of TNCs is evidenced in their revenues compared to individual state 
economies. In 2015, the world’s top 10 richest corporations had a combined revenue of more than 
the 180 ‘poorest’ countries together.227 TNCs naturally use such power for their main purpose - to 
maximise profit.228 In the host states, the economic leverage of businesses from the developed 
countries is that ‘foreign direct investment [is] replacing intergovernmental aid as the most 
important means of transferring capital and technical know-how from the developed to the 
developing world’.229 Tomuschat even suggests that the economic power of certain TNCs gives 
them the ability to act without any governmental oversight.230 The phenomenon of (developing) 
states deliberately lowering regulatory standards to attract and retain investments is called ‘race to 
the bottom’ and in terms of human rights affects especially labour rights.231  
The race to the bottom in developing countries might be further fuelled by investments 
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known for being at the bottom in terms of protection of labour rights232 and Chinese investments 
have been implicated in lowering labour standards in some African host countries.233 In Namibia, 
it was reported that Chinese companies have not been adhering to national labour laws with 
impunity,234 which results in unfair competition. Local companies, in order to remain competitive, 
may then be compelled to equally lower their labour standards and, consequently, the influence of 
Chinese investors may have adverse effect on labour rights in the entire recipient region.235  
The home states of TNCs’ parent companies can also be very reluctant to regulate 
extraterritorial acts of these corporations and their subsidiaries.236 Currently, home states are not 
under a hard-law obligation to do so.237 Therefore, the threat of the TNC’s parent company 
relocating its seat to a different country may be sufficient to hamper imposition of a stricter 
regulation. Ruggie gives the example of Canada, which is home to the largest number of mining 
corporations in the world.238 Under the threat of exodus of mining TNCs from Canada, a regulation 
of overseas activities of mining business in relation to human rights failed in the Canadian 
Parliament in 2010.239 Moreover, home states of TNCs may sometimes block access to remedy for 
victims of human rights abuse for various political reasons. An example is the George W Bush’s 
2003 Executive Order no. 13303.240 This order represented a blank norm of sort, granting 
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Iraqi oil from lawsuit or enforcement in the United States.242  Its wording was so broad that it 
encompassed all possible impacts of oil companies’ operations, including environmental harm and 
human rights abuses. Consequently, US oil companies could be sued neither by US citizens, nor 
by foreigners under the US Alien Torts Statute.243  
Lastly, a specific situation can occur in countries which are emerging from conflicts or 
transitioning to democracy. Often in the process of transitional justice, former political elites will 
be prosecuted for abuse of human rights.244 Economic elites, however, are not as likely to be 
brought to justice, because they are seen as essential for rebuilding the society.245 Moreover, the 
weak state institutions in countries in transition can be especially vulnerable to obstruction of 
justice from corporations, which are using their power to escape justice for violations committed 
during conflict or dictatorship.246 Such practices include bribery and corruption, delaying and 
obstructing judicial proceedings, or even attacks against human rights advocates.247 
Taking into consideration the examples listed above, it can be concluded that the economic 
power of TNCs and the political environment in both home and host states are a significant factor 
frequently undermining the efforts to achieve accountable business. From this perspective, a 
comprehensive uniform international regulation might be a good solution. If the standards for 
business conduct are given a uniform benchmark, racing to the bottom in terms of regulation would 
no longer be an option.  
3.3. The corporate veil 
Based on the broad definition of a TNC provided above, the corporate structure of such 
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intermediaries.248 When it comes to human rights violations by such entities, uncovering the 
ownership structure can be of utmost importance for the victims’ access to effective remedies as 
well as access to assets available for enforcement.249 As the case may frequently be, the daughter 
company which violates human rights may not be sufficiently funded. Moreover, the host state’s 
criminal law may not provide for criminal liability of legal persons. Tracing the beneficiary of the 
subsidiary’s actions may therefore be the only chance for victims of human rights violations to 
access justice.250 
Nevertheless, regulations of liability of shareholders differ from state to state. Generally, 
both common law and civil law jurisdictions recognize the corporate law principle of separate 
personality,251 under which shareholders are not personally liable for debts of the company in 
question. This divide can exceptionally be overcome by courts by extending liability in an act 
commonly referred to as ‘piercing’ or ‘lifting’ the corporate veil.252 As Lord Sumption remarked, 
‘the recognition of a limited power to pierce the corporate veil in carefully defined circumstances 
is necessary if the law is not to be disarmed in the face of abuse’.253 
Most EU jurisdictions allow piercing of the corporate veil in some situations. It is, however, 
considered as a ‘narrow exception’ from the doctrine of separate personality.254 According to 
Augenstein’s 2010 report to the European Commission, the veil-piercing is essentially possible in 
two scenarios. Either when the parent’s and the subsidiary’s assets are commingled and used in 
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of shareholders.256 Similar approach to the veil-piercing is prevailing in the common law 
jurisdictions,257 considering the abuse of law to be the justification for disregarding a separate legal 
personality.258 Likewise in China, the corporate veil may be lifted when a shareholder intentionally 
abuses it and causes serious harm to the company’s creditors.259  
If these rules on corporate veil-piercing were interpreted sufficiently broadly, they would 
potentially allow holding at least some parent companies liable for human rights abuses by their 
offshore subsidiaries. However, courts are generally reluctant to extend interpretation of these 
rules beyond a very narrow ambit.260 Principally, using the corporate veil to allocate business-
associated risks is regarded as legitimate and does not as such justify veil piercing.261 Making use 
of the difference in regulations of corporate veil in different jurisdictions, transnational business 
can thus engage in ‘shell games’ to shield itself from responsibility.262   
The corporate veil can pose a hurdle for human rights claimants in all three stages of the 
proceedings.263 First, they must demonstrate a prima facie case against the parent company in the 
jurisdictional phase. Second, if the claim successfully proceeds to the merits phase, the claimants 
must prove a fraudulent intention of the parent company or prove that the subsidiary is just a 
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successfully sue the offshore subsidiary as the subsidiary may be underfunded, insolvent or even 
defunct.264 
In contrast, quite effective corporate veil-piercing is possible based on an international 
treaty, as evidenced by the international investment law practice and as pointed out by Vastardis 
and Chambers.265 As they concur, the difference between the effective bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT) veil-piercing regime and the ineffective and burdensome national-law regime can be well 
demonstrated on the cases of the oil giant Chevron (formerly Texaco) in Ecuador.266 Chevron is 
one of the most profitable TNCs in the world.267 When it was sued by Ecuadorian and Peruvian 
victims of its subsidiary’s activities, it invoked the corporate veil defence on every occasion.268 In 
the respective proceedings initiated in 1993 in the United States,269 the claims were dismissed on 
forum non conveniens grounds. In a subsequent lawsuit in Ecuador, Chevron challenged 
jurisdiction of Ecuador’s courts, bringing up the corporate veil again.270 The Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
obtained a favourable judgment in Ecuador, however, Chevron no longer had any assets available 
for enforcement there. Eventually, the whole saga ended in Canada, where attempts to enforce the 
Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron’s Canadian subsidiary failed, yet again, on corporate veil 
issues. To the issue of separate personality, the Canadian court asserted that: 
[i]t is a bedrock principle of our corporate law. […] [It] means 
that corporations are separate entities from their 
shareholders, capable of carrying on business and incurring 
debts on their own behalf. Thus, if a judgment debtor is a 
parent corporation, it and not its shareholders or subsidiaries, 
is responsible for the debts it incurs.271 
Conversely, when Chevron initiated arbitral proceedings against Ecuador alleging denial 
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jurisdictional questions was whether Chevron could claim rights stemming from an investment of 
its subsidiary, TexPet. To that point, the arbitral tribunal asserted that ‘as TexPet’s parent 
company, Chevron is a covered investor under Article I(1)(a) of the BIT because it indirectly owns 
or controls an “investment” in Ecuador.’272  
 It is therefore evident that the standard for sufficient control of a parent company over a 
subsidiary that would justify disregarding the corporate principle of separate personality is set 
lower in international investment law. Although international investment law is far from uniform, 
Vastardis and Chambers note that there is certain consistency which, they suggest, could be used 
as a guidance for rethinking the current restrictive interpretation of the separate personality 
doctrine.273 Specifically, they propose rethinking the test of control of the parent over the 
subsidiary. The control required by investment law focuses only to legal factors, such as ownership 
or managerial control, without any need for a proof of the actual involvement of the parent in the 
subsidiary’s actions.274 To the contrary, national courts generally only pierce the corporate veil in 
situations of a very substantial control of the parent over the subsidiary, where the subsidiary 
essentially serves as a mere vehicle.275 Such high standard is a heavy burden of proof to carry for 
many human rights claimants.  
In conclusion, national courts are rather reluctant to pierce the corporate veil, unless there 
is strong evidence of bad faith. Generally, however, using the corporate veil to allocate business-
associated risks is regarded as legitimate and does not as such justify veil piercing. The principle 
of separate legal personality combined with this reluctancy of national therefore courts enables 
TNCs to avoid civil and/or criminal liability by establishing a network of subsidiaries. A possible 
solution in cases of human rights abuse by TNCs would thus be adopting a model similar to the 
one found in international investment law. This would mean focusing on legal requirements, such 
as certain ownership share, rather than attempting to prove bad faith and/or specific control in each 
individual instance. Unless a more victim-friendly approach to veil piercing is adopted, holding 




272 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No 2009–23 Third 
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (27 February 2012), para. 4.24 
273 Vastardis and Chambers (supra note 260), p. 414. 
274 Ibid., p. 414. 




judgements is near impossible for some, and excessively burdensome for other victims of 
corporate human rights abuse. 
3.4. Jurisdictional obstacles in civil liability cases 
Frequently, it is enterprises domiciled in developed countries who decide to expand to 
developing countries, motivated by cheap work force or rich natural resources. According to 
OECD data, 60% of foreign affiliate production worldwide are controlled from the United States, 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands and Switzerland.276 The TNCs then 
significantly influence the population and the environment of the developing world, sometimes 
with a detrimental effect.277 As a consequence, courts in rich Western countries are dealing with 
an increasing number of civil liability cases against TNCs for human rights abuses in developing 
countries.278 Only a small minority of such cases, however, reach the trial phase. Most, to the 
contrary, end in settlement or fail on procedural issues.279 This subsection focuses on selected 
jurisdictions (common law and civil law), in particular the United States and the EU member states, 
in order to provide a more detailed analysis of the jurisdictional issues connected to human rights 
violations happening abroad.  
3.4.1. The narrow interpretation of the United States Alien Torts Statute 
The United States Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350), also known as the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, is a federal law adopted in 1789, which reads as follows:  
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
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This law, being nearly as old as the United States themself, was originally intended to cover 
torts such as piracy.280 With time, the US courts also confirmed its applicability to cases of 
genocide, slave trading, forced labour or war crimes.281 In spite of its age, it has been brought back 
to life in relatively recent cases in the context of human rights violations,282 the first human rights 
cases being filed against individuals. Several Alien Torts Statute cases had since been filed against 
corporations, giving hope to victims of human rights abuse by TNCs abroad. The interpretation of 
the Statute by the US courts, however, has left them rather disappointed.  
In 1995, a group of men was executed by hanging in Nigeria. These men were 
environmental activists protesting against Royal Dutch Shell oil corporation polluting their land. 
Their execution was a result of a trial allegedly tainted by torture and corruption. In 2002, wives 
and relatives of the executed men led by Esther Kiobel filed a suit under the US Alien Tort Statute 
against several affiliated companies incorporated in the Netherlands, the UK and Nigeria283 
(hereinafter together as ‘Shell’) before the federal court in New York. They claimed that the 
execution of their relatives was caused by Shell engaging in bribery and witness tampering. Shell 
was accused of encouraging and aiding extrajudicial killings, crimes against humanity, torture and 
cruel treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and 
association, forced exile and property destruction.284 The Kiobel v. Shell case made its way to the 
US Supreme Court, which unanimously declined its jurisdiction. It reasoned that US law is not 
applicable to violations of the law of nations happening in Nigeria, stating that ‘[c]orporations are 
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence 
suffices.’285 The court did, however, not state what connection would be sufficient to secure the 
jurisdiction of the US courts over TNCs’ torts happening abroad. It only stated that the claims must 
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did not answer the question of whether a corporation has direct obligations under international 
law.287 
In other preceding cases under the Alien Torts Statute, however, the US courts have, in 
principle, accepted that TNCs can be directly responsible for violations of human rights. In Doe v. 
Unocal, the US Court of Appeals found that TNCs may be held responsible under the Alien Torts 
Statute even when they were only complicit to human rights abuses, aiding and abetting such 
acts.288 The court stated that mere knowledge of the abuses was sufficient to establish 
responsibility and that intention was not required.289 Doe v. Unocal was eventually settled out of 
court. Nonetheless, the reasoning of the appellate court potentially carried significant precedential 
value. 
In light of the opinions voiced in Kiobel v. Shell and Doe v. Unocal, a surprising shift in 
the interpretation of the Alien Torts Statute came in 2014 with the case of Cardona et al. 
v. Chiquita. Chiquita was sued in the US by over four thousand Colombian nationals for funding 
paramilitary organizations which, in the 1990s, tortured and killed the plaintiffs’ relatives. The 
case was significant in that Chiquita, unlike Shell, is a multinational corporation incorporated in 
the US, where it also has its headquarters.290 What is more, Chiquita had, in 2007, pleaded guilty 
for financing the paramilitary groups in Colombia before a district court in the US and paid a $25 
million fine for financing terrorism.291 In spite of all that, the court, citing Kiobel v. Shell, held that 
there is no connection of sufficient force to link the claim to the US.292 
Lastly, in 2018, the restrictive interpretation of the Alien Torts Statute was tightened even 
further by the US Supreme Court in the case of Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC. The Supreme Court had, 
in a split 5-4 decision, held that ‘[i]t does not follow, however, that current principles of 
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or other artificial entities.293 In relation to the Alien Torts Statute, the Supreme Court further 
argued that 
allowing plaintiffs to sue foreign corporations under the ATS 
could establish a precedent that discourages American 
corporations from investing abroad, including in developing 
economies where the host government might have a history of 
alleged human-rights violations, or where judicial systems 
might lack the safeguards of United States courts.294 
Having in mind that corporations are not recognized as subjects of public international law, 
the reluctancy of the Supreme Court to defy this notion is understandable. On the other hand, the 
fact that the home states of the victims of corporate human rights abuses are countries with a 
certain history and/or unfavourable political climate, as well as the fact that their home states have 
less functioning judicial systems, is exactly why the victims turn to the courts in the United States. 
Either way, the hope the victims of corporate human rights abuse happening abroad may have had 
in the Alien Torts Statute after Kiobel v. Shell and Doe v. Unocal is likely gone. Even if the courts 
decided to hear their case, they would be asked to apply international law. And as the regulatory 
gap regarding corporate responsibility for human rights violations exists in international law,295 
the courts could not bridge the gap by means of interpretation. It is therefore unlikely that the Alien 
Torts Statute will be the instrument capable to bring justice to those whose human rights have been 
violated by TNCs. 
3.4.2. The obstacle of forum non conveniens  
Victims of alleged human rights violations happening outside the United States sometimes 
file lawsuits in the US under other rules than the Alien Tort Statute. For instance, although the 
Cardona et al. v. Chiquita claim described in the previous subsection failed under the Alien Torts 
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frequently similar factual basis as the cases based on the Alien Torts Statute, arising from 
circumstances such as environmental harm297 or poor labour conditions.298  
However, unless these foreign liability cases are settled, they are still very likely to be 
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds.299 This doctrine essentially allows courts to refuse to 
hear a case if they deem a different forum to be a better suited alternative.300 It is a right of every 
defendant to invoke this doctrine and in case of injuries occurring abroad, TNCs as defendants are 
arguably the main group benefiting from it.301 This is so because when assessing the forum non 
conveniens motion, the courts generally have a presumption that the plaintiff’s home forum is the 
convenient one. A contrario in cases of foreigners, the presumption is that a court in the United 
States is ‘inconvenient’302 and, if not proven otherwise, the case shall not be heard. Inconvenience 
is also present in cases where the courts would have to apply unfamiliar law303 or have worse 
access to evidence and witnesses.304 Moreover, according to the judgment in re Piper v. Reyno, 
courts shall not give much relevance to the fact that the alternative forum has less favourable 
substantive law.305 Considering these factors, it becomes apparent that the forum non conveniens 
doctrine poses a serious hurdle to foreigners injured by subsidiaries of US-domiciled TNCs in 
obtaining justice.  
Apart from the forum non conveniens doctrine stricto sensu, some also differentiate the 
‘act of state’ doctrine closely related to the state sovereignty, under which a US court may decline 
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concerning political questions, including US foreign policy, in order to preserve separation of 
powers of the three branches of US government.307 
An example of the forum non conveniens doctrine serving as grounds for US court’s refusal 
to hear a case of serious human rights violations is the infamous Bhopal litigation. In 1984 in 
Indian Bhopal, a poisonous gas leaked from a chemical plant operated by an Indian subsidiary of 
a US-domiciled corporation, the Union Carbide Corporation. The US-based parent exercised 
significant managerial control over the subsidiary.308 The incident, now known as the Bhopal 
disaster, left thousands of Indians killed or injured.309 The victims brought a number of cases 
against Union Carbide Corporation, which were consolidated into one case before the US Federal 
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The court, however, dismissed the case on 
the basis of forum non conveniens. The court argued that taking up the litigation would mean an 
excessive burden on the American taxpayers, while stating that India was the more appropriate 
forum.310 Interestingly, the Indian plaintiffs were represented by the Indian government and 
claimed that Indian courts would not adjudicate the case.311 To this concern, the court argued: 
In the Court’s view, to retain the litigation in this forum, as 
plaintiffs request, would be yet another example of 
imperialism, another situation in which an established 
sovereign inflicted its rules, its standards and values on a 
developing nation.312  
The Bhopal disaster claims were eventually settled in India, however, the settlement 
received harsh criticism. Firstly, it was negotiated by the Indian government without the 
participation of the victims. Secondly, the TNC was granted both civil and criminal immunity. 
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Therefore, the victims of Union Carbide Corporation’s wrongdoings were left without adequate 
satisfaction. The doctrine of forum non conveniens used by the US court to divert the dispute to 
India paired with the subsequent engagement of the Indian government created an obstacle to 
holding the Union Carbide Corporation liable in the full extent.  
As US courts will be considered prima facie ‘inconvenient’, other human rights plaintiffs 
from outside the US will face the same hurdles of a relatively high burden of proof to fight off the 
forum non conveniens argument of TNCs. 
3.4.3. Jurisdiction of EU member states’ national courts 
Unlike the United States, other countries do not have a law similar to the US Alien Torts 
Statute,314 which would give original jurisdiction to national courts over civil liability claims 
stemming from violations of international law. The cases brought before their courts against 
transnational businesses for acts occurring abroad are therefore usually based on general principles 
of domestic law, especially the tort of negligence.315 Also for this reason, these cases are not so 
explicitly framed as human rights cases, although they touch upon important human rights 
matters.316 With the restrictions imposed on the applicability of the US Alien Tort Statute, the 
attention has recently turned to the EU member states in search for a new forum for foreign direct 
liability cases.317 
With regard to the EU, the rules determining jurisdiction of courts depend on the domicile 
of the defendant. In cases of EU domiciled defendants, uniform rules under Brussels Ibis Regulation 
apply. Under this Regulation, a company is domiciled where it has its statutory seat, central 
administration or principal place of business.318 In cases of human rights violations happening 
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companies319 which are domiciled in one of the member states. Moreover, as follows from the 
ECJ’s judgment in re Owusu v. Jackson and Others, the Brussels regime is strict and does not 
allow courts to reject jurisdiction on the forum non conveniens grounds.320 However, most of the 
alleged human rights violations are committed by subsidiaries domiciled outside of the EU.321 
There, the major obstacle to holding EU-based parent companies of TNCs liable is, therefore, the 
corporate veil.322  
Conversely, in cases where the defendant is not from one of the member states, domestic 
law of the individual member states will be applicable.323 Many member states have domestic rules 
on jurisdiction similar to the Brussels regime and do not provide for jurisdiction over foreign 
entities, including subsidiaries of TNCs.324 Some, however, enable the jurisdiction over a foreign 
defendant to ‘anchor’ to jurisdiction over another, domiciled defendant (i.e. predominantly the 
parent company).325 Naturally, the prerequisite for such anchoring is either piercing the corporate 
veil, or inferring a primary duty of care of the domiciled defendant. Furthermore, the criteria for 
establishing such anchor jurisdiction are certain connection between the claims,326 as well as the 
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Moreover, in some EU member states, it is possible for courts to assume jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial human rights violations on the basis of the doctrine of forum necessitatis.328 The 
courts may do so in order to ensure access to justice if they find that there is a connection of the 
claim to the forum state and if there is no other forum where the plaintiff can be reasonably 
expected to sue.329 Due to narrow interpretation of this rule, however, many cases of transnational 
human rights violations may fall through the cracks. The following examples from France, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom330 show different trends in approaching this subject by the 
EU member states’ courts. 
On 14 September 2017, the French Court of Cassation rejected to assume jurisdiction in 
the case of Comilog litigation on the basis of forum neccesitatis.331 The case concerned 
approximately 900 workers from Congo, whose rights were allegedly violated by a Gabonese 
mining company Comilog. In 1992, the workers sued Comilog in Congo. Their case went through 
jurisdictional challenges and appeals and had not reached the merits phase even after 25 years 
since the filing. The necessary connection to France was given, as Comilog is a subsidiary of a 
French company. The Court of Cassation nonetheless concluded that because the plaintiffs were 
able to file the lawsuit in Congo, they had access to justice and the doctrine of forum necessitatis 
cannot be applied.332 Such narrow and arguably very formalistic interpretation of the forum 
necessitatis doctrine and of the notion of access to justice poses a significant obstacle to the 
transnational human rights litigation in some EU member states. 
Contrary to the French court in Comilog, several recent decisions of the EU member states’ 
courts approached the notion of access to justice relatively widely. These decisions sparked hope 
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companies. For example, on 1 May 2019, the District Court of the Hague held that it had 
jurisdiction in the Kiobel v. Shell case,333 which previously failed in the United States.334 Perhaps 
even more significant is, however, the judgment on jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom from 10 April 2019 in re Vedanta v. Lungowe.335 This case concerns a copper mining 
company Vedanta Resources domiciled in the UK and its Zambian subsidiary. This corporation 
was sued in 2015 by hundreds of Zambian villagers who lodged a claim in the UK for alleged 
harm on their health and property. The harm was caused by water pollution due to toxic leaks from 
the copper mine operated by Vedanta’s subsidiary. The Supreme Court, upon Vedanta’s challenge, 
upheld the jurisdiction of UK courts. In relation to Vedanta’s duty of care, the court stated that: 
[e]verything depends on the extent to which, and the way in 
which, the parent availed itself of the opportunity to take over, 
intervene in, control, supervise or advise the management of 
the relevant operations […] of the subsidiary.336 
Having found enough evidence of control to infer a primary duty of care of the parent 
company, the court did not have to pierce the corporate veil and jurisdiction over the claim against 
Vedanta was sustained under the Brussels Ibis Regulation.337 As to Vedanta’s subsidiary, the court 
then concluded that the jurisdiction of the UK courts shall be upheld, because there was no abuse 
of process, the defendant was a ‘necessary and proper’ party and there was a real risk that the 
Zambian claimants would not be able to obtain ‘substantial justice’ in Zambia.338 This risk was 
specifically found in the potential ‘impossibility of funding such group claims where the claimants 
were all in extreme poverty..’339 and ‘the absence within Zambia of sufficiently substantial and 
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effectively.’340 It seems that the approach of the UK Supreme Court to the notion of access to 
justice is, as opposed to the French Comilog case, leaving formalism behind. 
In conclusion, the preconditions for the jurisdiction of the EU member states’ courts over 
the claims against foreign corporations are potentially hard to prove. Certain connection to the 
member state will be required for making a successful case. In cases of TNCs with EU-domiciled 
parent companies, a significant level of control over their subsidiary’s actions must be proven. 
Some even fear that the recent developments will only induce the EU-based parent companies to 
‘take a hands-off approach’ towards their subsidiaries.341 Nonetheless, the decisions of the national 
courts in the UK and the Netherlands described above indicate that some EU jurisdictions and the 
UK, having recently left the EU, are a promising new forum for the human rights litigation. 
In light of the analysis provided in this Chapter, it can be concluded that national law and 
national jurisdiction are, under current circumstances, not completely suitable for holding TNCs 
to account for human rights abuses. The states are not under an obligation to protect human rights 
outside of their jurisdiction, which is essentially territorial. The states which are home to parent 
companies of TNCs are frequently profiting from being the country of domicile and are reluctant 
to regulate the activities of these TNCs beyond national borders. Developing countries are, 
moreover, often depending on foreign direct investment and are racing to the bottom in terms of 
regulation in order to keep the investments coming. These factors cause a situation in which the 
standards to which TNCs must live up to under national law in terms of human rights are rather 
low.  
National law and national jurisdiction are also not designed to provide justice to victims of 
corporate human rights abuse committed by TNCs. These victims have their access to justice 
obstructed by several hurdles. The corporate law principle of separate legal personality means that 
if their rights are violated by a TNC’s subsidiary, their chances of obtaining a judgement against 
the TNC’s parent are depending on whether national courts will lift the corporate veil. The burden 
of proof is, however, set very high in those cases. As the subsidiary may not have sufficient funds, 
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jurisdictional obstacles in some Western jurisdictions render the likelihood of successful lawsuit 
rather low.  
Considering all of the obstacles to accountable transnational business on national level 
described in this Chapter, the arguments in favour of a uniform international regulation of business 
and human rights seem to gain strength. As TNCs are in their nature not confined by national 
borders, national law without unified international approach can only achieve so much. The 
argument that ‘transnational issues must be approached and addressed by the entire international 
community differently from that provided for in existing domestic and international legislation’342 
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4. International soft law instruments on corporate social responsibility 
The arguments against extending human rights obligations directly to TNCs come from a 
certain understanding of what a TNC is and what is its social responsibility. It may be argued that 
TNCs are private persons and as such can only be beneficiaries of rules protecting human rights.343 
Some also argue that corporations have only one responsibility – to make profit for the 
shareholders.344 To imply otherwise would mean that the corporation can interfere into the affairs 
of the sovereign states and be the ‘moral arbiter’ on policy issues.345 Nonetheless, there are 
numerous instruments establishing rules on corporate social responsibility. Although not directly 
binding, they do create a new paradigm in which a TNC is morally expected to observe some 
standards of behaviour.346 As Ruggie suggests, there are legal norms and social norms based in 
morality, both of which have normative power vis-à-vis business. The social norms, however, have 
a broader reach, as they expect TNCs to ‘respect human rights, irrespective of a state’s willingness 
or ability to enforce the law.’347 The normative power of these social norms is evidenced by the 
fact that TNCs increasingly recognize their social responsibility by adopting new codes of 
conduct.348 For example as of December 2019, the UN Global Compact has 9,953 participating 
companies.349 Moreover, even though soft law instruments do not impose enforceable obligations, 
they may develop into hard law in time, either by serving as grounds for negotiating an 
international treaty, or by providing the necessary state practice for the development of an 
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the prominent soft law instruments help in bringing cases of human rights abuses to the public eye, 
inducing the naming and shaming in the court of public opinion. 
The aim of this Chapter is to explore the possibilities offered by the most prominent 
instruments on corporate social responsibility on a path to the corporate accountability for human 
rights abuses. To identify which instruments are of most relevance, a 2017 declaration of the G20 
leaders comes helpful.351 There, the G20 leaders committed to ‘the implementation of labour, 
social and environmental standards and human rights in line with internationally recognised 
frameworks’,352 explicitly naming the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the 
ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.353 This chapter will therefore examine 
these three existing instruments, insofar as they concern business and human rights. By looking at 
the process of developing these instruments, their implementation and the reaction they have 
received, this Chapter seeks to offer an outlook on how they are advancing the debate on business 
and human rights and what effect are they capable of inducing. 
4.1. United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights 
In 2005, the UN Secretary General appointed Professor John Ruggie as the UN Special 
Representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises. His mandate was to identify and clarify standards and best practices in the area of 
business and human rights and to develop materials for human rights impact assessments.354 Ruggie’s 
appointment followed a refusal of the UN Commission on Human Rights to adopt the UN Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights (Norms). These Norms were developed by the UN Sub-Commission on the 
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to TNCs.355 The Norms were, however, rather harshly criticized for their ambiguity by Ruggie 
himself.356 He criticized, among other factors, that the Norms did not distinguish between 
obligations of states and of corporations.357 
Therefore, when outlining his work as the Special Representative, Ruggie took an approach 
intentionally different from the one taken by the drafters of the Norms.358 He opted to incorporate 
all relevant actors in one ‘normative platform’, which would align the business-related human 
rights policy of states, civil society and business.359 Accordingly, he came up with the ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ Framework (Framework), which is composed of three pillars. The first pillar 
is based on the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, the second pillar 
addresses corporate responsibility to respect human rights and the third pillar deals with the 
victims’ access to effective remedies.360 Additionally, to implement the Framework, Ruggie 
introduced the Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (GPs).361 Essentially, ‘The 
Framework addresses what should be done; the Guiding Principles how to do it.’362 The GPs were 
adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011,363 establishing them as ‘the authoritative 
global reference point for business and human rights.’364 The duty of states to protect human rights 
and thereunder also to provide access to remedy for victims of human rights abuse is relatively 
well established in international human rights law.365 Therefore, the second pillar of the 
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innovative. Ruggie calls the second pillar a ‘centrepiece’ of the Framework and the GPs.366 As the 
state obligations were discussed in the previous Chapters, this section will further focus solely on 
the second pillar, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.  
By giving corporations a separate pillar, independent from the obligations of states, Ruggie 
sought to provide a clearer delimitation of corporate social responsibility.367 This responsibility 
does not stand only on legal norms enforced by the states,368 but also on social norms of conduct 
enforced by the public opinion.369 According to Ruggie, the social norm which requires business 
to respect human rights derives its normative power from its ‘near-universal recognition’.370 The 
GPs define respect as a duty to ‘avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts’,371 
i.e. duty of noninfringement.372 Importantly, the duty is extended to supply chains of TNCs, by 
requiring corporations to ‘prevent or mitigate’ adverse impacts on human rights in their ‘business 
relationships’.373 This prevents TNCs from outsourcing human rights abuses down their value 
chains.  
Besides defining the character and scope of the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, the GPs provide a set of policies and processes corporations should adopt to discharge this 
responsibility.374 First, business corporations are expected to adopt and make public a ‘policy 
commitment’ of the company to respect human rights.375 Second, according to Ruggie, to 
discharge corporate responsibility, the company must ‘know’ and ‘show’ that it respects human 
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corporation causes or contributes to an adverse impact on human rights, it should actively engage 
in remediation.378  
After the adoption of the GPs in 2011, the Human Rights Council took steps towards 
supporting better implementation of the GPs. It established the UN Working Group on the issue 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises with a mandate to 
inter alia promote the effective and comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the 
GPs.379 The Human Rights Council also established a Forum on Business and Human Rights,380 
which is the largest annual gathering of its kind, bringing together governments, business, civil 
society, law firms, investors, UN bodies and other stakeholders.381 As the GPs are addressed to 
both states and corporations, their implementation is to be realized autonomously on both fronts. 
States integrate the GPs into national action plans and policies, with the EU leading by example.382 
They are encouraged to do so by regional organizations, such as the Council of Europe383 and the 
Organization of American States.384 Corporations, on the other hand, include commitments into 




378 Ibid., pp. 15 and 20, principles 15(c) and 22. 
379 UN Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
(6 July 2011), A/HRC/RES/17/4, p. 2, para. 6(a). 
380 Ibid., p. 3, para. 12. 
381 UN Human Rights Office of the Hight Comissioner, ‘About the UN Forum on business and human rights’ 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/ForumonBusinessandHumanRights.aspx> accessed 10 
January 2020. 
382 Jitka Brodská and Harald Christian Scheu ‘The European Union and its Member States and the Implementation of 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ in Pavel Šturma and Vinícius Almada Mozetic (eds), 
Business and Human Rights (rw&w Science & New Media Passau-Berlin-Prague 2018), p. 157; Beata Faracik 
‘Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ [2017] paper requested by the 
European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO_STU(2017)578031_EN.pdf> 
accessed 20 December 2019, p. 8. 
383 See Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States, 
Human Rights and business (2 March 2016). 
384 See Organization of American States, General Assembly resolution AG/RES. 2840 (XLIV-O/14), Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights in Business (4 June 2014). 
385 See e.g. Apple Inc., ‘2018 Statement on Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking and Slavery in Our Business and 
Supply Chains’ < https://www.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/pdf/Apple-Combat-Human-Trafficking-and-
Slavery-in-Supply-Chain-2018.pdf> accessed 10 January 2020, p. 3; Michelle Langlois, ‘Reporting Trends & 
Insights: Are Companies Making the Commitment to Respect Human Rights?’ (Shift Project Ltd. and Mazars LLP) 
<https://www.ungpreporting.org/reporting-insights-trends-are-companies-making-the-commitment-to-respect-




such as Apple, AT&T, China Mobile, Facebook, Google, Microsoft or Samsung Electronics 
engage in voluntary self-reporting through the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework.386  
Despite the generally positive acceptance of the GPs by states and the Human Rights 
Council, the GPs were also criticized, mainly from various human rights NGOs. The main 
concerns of the NGOs included the lack of enforceability of the GPs and the lack of extraterritorial 
applicability of the state duty to protect human rights.387 For example, the Human Rights Watch’s 
business and human rights director commented on the adoption of the GPs stating that ‘[i]n effect, 
the council endorsed the status quo: a world where companies are encouraged, but not obliged, 
to respect human rights’.388 Moreover, although the implementation of the GPs by states and some 
corporations on policy level has been very broad, real material progress in respect for human rights 
and access to remedy for victims has not been growing correspondingly.389  
Ultimately, the evaluation of the GPs’ implementation depends on whether one sees the 
glass as half empty or half full.390 While the GPs represent an important first step towards 
accountable business, they are not binding and cannot single-handedly resolve all of the global 
issues surrounding the adverse impact that business has on human rights. Importantly, however, 
the GPs managed to shift the global debate from whether corporations should respect human rights 
to how should they live up to their social responsibility to respect human rights. Moreover, the 
GPs gave the debate a common language.391 Thus, although the effectiveness of the GPs may be 
questioned for their soft law nature, they managed to bring all the relevant stakeholders to one 
table. Such achievement might not have been realized by a more radical hard-law regulation, as 
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4.2. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) are essentially a set of 
recommendations for responsible business conduct multilaterally agreed by the governments of 
the OECD countries.392 The Guidelines were adopted in 1976 as a part of the Declaration on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, aimed at promoting an open and 
transparent international investment climate and encouraging corporations to contribute to the 
economic and social development. They are unique as they are the only instrument on corporate 
social responsibility adopted directly by national governments.393 In 2011, the Guidelines were 
updated in line with the UN GPs on Business and Human Rights to include a new chapter on 
human rights, a due diligence obligation and extension to corporate supply chains.394 Although the 
Guidelines are limited to the adhering countries, the adhering governments encourage TNCs to 
comply with the Guidelines wherever they operate.395 The potential reach of the Guidelines is 
therefore very broad, as the adhering countries are home states of the majority of TNCs and a 
source of the majority of foreign direct investment.396  
The Guidelines are voluntary and non-binding, much like the UN GPs. Nonetheless, they 
do contain an implementation mechanism binding on the adhering governments. The adhering 
governments are required to set up National Contact Points (NCPs) to promote the Guidelines, 
handle enquiries and contribute ‘to the resolution of issues that arise relating to the implementation 
of the Guidelines’.397 The latter capacity of the NCPs is especially significant in cases of alleged 
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as adversely impacted individuals, unions and NGOs are entitled to file complaints with the NCPs 
alleging corporate breaches of the Guidelines. In such cases, the respective NCP may handle both 
cases of violations committed in the territory of the NCP’s state by TNCs seated anywhere in the 
world, or violations committed anywhere by TNCs seated in the NCP’s state.400 After the 2011 
inclusion of the human rights chapter, a considerable majority of submitted complaints concerned 
human rights.401 If the complaint (called ‘specific instance’) is admissible, the NCP acts as a 
‘forum for discussion’,402 offering conciliation and mediation to the concerned parties. The NCP 
then, regardless of the outcome, issues a ‘statement’ which may indicate that a TNC has breached 
the Guidelines and may also set out recommendations.403 
The role of the NCPs and the ways of dealing with specific instances have been criticized 
for multiple reasons. First, the adhering countries ‘have flexibility’ in organizing their NCPs.404 
Consequently, some NCPs are complex governmental offices, while others are a single designated 
person.405 Moreover, there is no clear uniform procedure set for NCPs’ handling of complaints. 
NCPs also have very weak investigatory powers.406 Such structural and procedural inconsistencies 
may, according to some, render the whole system of NCPs ineffective.407 Second, the final 
statement of the NCP is not binding on the respective TNC and does not impose any penalty. The 
lack of enforceability may also raise questions as to the effectiveness of the process.408 
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reason is that confidentiality is prescribed for procedures regarding a specific instance and even 
after they are closed, the disclosure is possible only upon a consent of the parties.410 
Although the potential of the NCPs to serve as gateways for access to remedy against TNCs 
seems not to be fully realized yet,411 the specific instances can sometimes provide the exposure 
necessary to create pressure from the public.412  Naming and shaming in the court of public opinion 
has, in some instances, proven as an effective alternative to legal enforcement. After the 2011 
inclusion of the human rights chapter to the Guidelines, some cases of specific instances leading 
to a successful outcome affirm the relevance of this system,413 with corporations such as 
Heineken,414 Kinross,415 Statkraft416 and FIFA417 accepting part of their social responsibility. This, 
according to some, demonstrates that the NCP system for the Guidelines ‘can be effective for 
providing access to remedy in the business and human rights domain’.418  
4.3. ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy 
The International Labour Organization was established to prevent social unrest due to 
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to the bottom’, i.e. that deregulation of labour can be favoured by governments as it can attract 
foreign capital.420 Accordingly, the ILO offers a forum for negotiation of minimum non-negotiable 
standards of work between all relevant actors - governments, employers and labour 
organizations.421  
This tripartite character of the ILO is also reflected in the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (ILO Declaration), which was 
first adopted in 1977 and updated several times, most recently in 2017.422 Much like the UN GPs, 
the ILO Declaration recognizes that ‘different actors have a specific role to play’.423 Therefore, 
besides multinational and local business, it is addressed to governments and employers’ and 
workers’ organizations of both the home and the host countries.424 The ILO Declaration is 
described as a set of recommendations to be observed on a voluntary basis.425 Nonetheless, it 
derives some authority from the fact that it can be seen as an interpretative tool to international 
labour Conventions, Recommendations and other ILO documents on which it is based.426 Most 
significant principles contained in the ILO Declaration from the human rights perspective include 
those concerning elimination of forced or compulsory labour, effective abolition of child labour, 
safety and health, freedom of association and the right to organize or access to remedy for victims 
of human rights abuses.  
In terms of implementation of the ILO Declaration, there are several possible procedures 
available. The ILO Governing Body established the ILO Subcommittee on Multinational 
Enterprises in 1993. The mandate of the Subcommittee is to ‘conduct periodic surveys on the effect 
given to the [ILO] MNE Declaration’ and to ‘consider requests for the interpretation of the 
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contributed to by states, employers and workers’ organisations to provide information on 
implementation of the ILO Declaration. As Clapham notes, however, this mechanism is not very 
effective, because all the names of TNCs are anonymized and very little information on human 
rights abuse can be derived from the surveys.428 Regarding the latter mandate, the Subcommittee 
takes part in considerations of requests for interpretation of the ILO Declaration, which are 
primarily to be field by governments.429 These requests must follow from a disagreement on 
meaning of provisions of the ILO Declaration concerning an actual situation.430 Moreover, the 
requests cannot be filed if they would conflict with matters of national law or international labour 
Conventions and Recommendations.431 This primacy of national law potentially renders the ILO 
Declaration less effective.432 Although the procedure concerns an actual specific situation and thus 
might resemble a dispute resolution mechanism, it is only aimed at clarifying the standards 
contained in the ILO Declaration.433  
Although the ILO Declaration is criticized for its weakness in terms of enforceability, it is 
still one of the most prominent international instruments on corporate social responsibility. It 
embodies minimum international labour standards and as such lays a solid foundation for possible 
future hard obligations.434 
In conclusion, the selected soft law instruments described in this Chapter are not 
enforceable and thus certainly not the best solution many human rights defenders would hope for. 
They are, nonetheless, very important contributions to the debate surrounding transnational 
business and its responsibility to respect human rights. Every time a large-scale business-related 
violation of human rights occurs, these instruments provide a benchmark against which it can be 
measured. Although they will not trigger responsibility and courts will not enforce them, they can 
provide basis for the formation of public opinion and potential platform for naming and shaming. 
The positive influence of drafting such widely recognized voluntary instruments and formulating 
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which are voluntarily including them into codes of conduct. Likewise, many states are using them 
as tools to develop national policy and action plans on business and human rights.  
Since these instruments on corporate social responsibility are not binding, they cannot fill 
the gaps in international and national law when it comes to enforcing responsibility of TNCs for 
human rights violations. However, they clearly formulate standards and principles which can be 
used when filling these gaps either as a guidance, an inspiration, or a verbatim draft. Most 
importantly, they help to shift the perception of corporations as simply profit-generating vehicles 






With the rapid globalisation of markets, states are no longer the only stakeholders capable 
of influencing, positively and negatively, the enjoyment of human rights. Transnational business 
has rapidly caught up with states in terms of economic power. In the host states, TNCs hold a 
significant leverage, as their investment is a powerful catalyst for economic development. 
However, the law and policy has not kept up with the changing reality of the distribution of power 
in the world. Although transnational business has increasingly been implicated in adverse human 
rights abuses, the victims of such abuses have faced many obstacles in holding the perpetrators to 
account. Due to this seeming regulatory gap, a need for a more effective accountability mechanism 
has been discussed among policy makers, scholars and civil society with conflicting outcomes. 
The solution could lie in a new comprehensive and uniform international treaty on business and 
human rights. Equally so, national law could suffice in achieving accountable business, if the 
concerned states set appropriate standards for business conduct and enforce their laws efficiently. 
The existing soft law instruments also have potential to induce TNCs to accept their social 
responsibility to respect human rights. This paper examined the underlying reasons why these 
possible accountability mechanisms do not exist or fall short of bridging the gap between power 
and responsibility of TNCs. The analysis contained in three separate chapters followed the division 
to international law, national law and soft law instruments. 
Chapter 2 set out to answer the following research question:  
What are the current obstacles to holding TNCs responsible for human rights abuses 
under public international law? 
Upon a conceptual analysis of the notion of legal personality in public international law, it 
became apparent that the obstacle lies in legal theory. The concept of international legal 
personality, i.e. the ability to have rights and obligations under international law, limits the number 
of subjects of public international law to a minimum. When observed from the historical 
perspective, this paradigm, in which states have the dominant personhood and exceptionally 
recognize some other subjects, makes sense. Equally in terms of human rights law, historically it 
was the state that represented the ultimate danger to the enjoyment of human rights and therefore 
it was also the state whose behaviour needed to be regulated. From a pragmatic standpoint, 
however, the changing power dynamics in transnational affairs could eventually induce a shift in 
this paradigm. Drafting a new, legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights 
law, the activities of TNCs, could be the appropriate tool. Careful balance, however, needs to be 




and victims of human rights violations. Otherwise, the end product will either be a very strong 
treaty with very few signatories, or a very weak proclamation incapable of changing the status 
quo. 
This paper, moreover, uncovered obstacles to using international criminal law to enforce 
corporate human rights obligations. Firstly, international criminal responsibility is still limited to 
natural persons. Even if, however, it was extended to legal persons, the majority of human rights 
abuses committed by TNCs would not be prosecuted, because they would not reach the intensity 
required for international crimes. Therefore, although potentially useful in certain limited cases, 
international criminal law cannot substitute enforcement mechanisms missing in international 
human rights law. This conclusion, again, supports the argument in favour of drafting a new 
international treaty on business and human rights. 
 Chapter 3 was dedicated to answering, through comparative analysis of legal rules from 
different jurisdictions, the following research question: 
Can TNCs be held accountable for human rights abuses on the national level? 
National law is the principal jurisdiction for legal regulation of TNCs. It is therefore 
essential to understand its current pitfalls in order to establish whether uniform international 
regulation of TNCs is necessary. This thesis scrutinised the limits of the duty of states to protect 
human rights and established that it is essentially territorial, hence excluding extraterritorial 
operations of TNCs from its scope. Furthermore, the economic benefits of having a TNC domiciled 
in the territory of one state do not motivate that state to tighten the regulation of external business 
activities of such corporations. Meanwhile, developing states are forced to race to the bottom in 
terms of regulation in order to attract foreign capital. All of these factors indicate that regulating 
transnational issues on the national level without any incentive to adhere to certain standards is 
not fit for the purpose of adequate protection of human rights. 
In terms of jurisdictional obstacles to corporate accountability on the national level, this 
paper identified several issues. First, the corporate veil created by the corporate law principle of 
separate legal personality enables TNCs to evade responsibility for human rights abuses by 
establishing special purpose vehicles. As the allocation of business-related risks is accepted as 
legitimate, the national courts are generally not willing to pierce the corporate veil. The victims 
are therefore facing a heavy burden of proof, which renders their chances of obtaining justice rather 
small. Moreover, other jurisdictional obstacles, including those specific to foreign direct liability 




particularly large number of domiciled TNCs. First, the case law on the US Alien Torts Statute 
was analysed. This instrument of national law enabling national courts to apply international law 
was invoked by victims of TNCs on several occasions. However, the interpretation of this statute 
was limited by the US Supreme Court in an extent which makes the success of further similar cases 
highly unlikely. Moreover, victims of business-related human rights abuse happening abroad are 
facing the obstacle of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, frequently invoked by TNCs as 
defendants. As the US courts will be considered prima facie ‘inconvenient’, human rights plaintiffs 
from outside the US will face the hurdle of a relatively high burden of proof to fight off the forum 
non conveniens argument. Lastly, the courts of the EU member states are seeing an increasing 
influx of foreign direct liability cases. The forum neccesitatis principle could help some plaintiffs 
with suing foreign corporations before EU member state’s courts. However, the interpretation of 
this principle is still quite inconsistent across the EU. Although some recent cases indicate that 
some victims of TNCs will be able to obtain justice in the EU, this forum is not likely to provide 
justice for all the victims of transnational business who need it. 
Considering the obstacles described in Chapter 3, it must be stated that although some 
TNCs can potentially be held accountable for human rights abuses on the national level, national 
law is not well positioned to hold all TNCs to account and to secure justice for all victims of 
business-related human rights abuse. This conclusion therefore also strengthens the arguments in 
favour of a uniform international regulation of business and human rights. As TNCs are in their 
nature not confined by national borders, national law without unified international approach can 
only achieve so much.  
Lastly, Chapter 4 describes some of the most prominent soft law instruments on corporate 
social responsibility, namely the UN GPs, the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Declaration with the 
aim to answer the following research question: 
Can the accountability mechanisms offered by existing international soft law instruments 
on corporate social responsibility fill the gaps in legal regulation of TNCs? 
Since all of the examined instruments are voluntary in nature, they cannot, strictly 
speaking, fill the gaps of hard law regulation. They are, nonetheless, significantly shaping the 
debate concerning TNCs and their role in the society. Thanks to their existence, TNCs and business 
corporations in general are increasingly being seen as not only entities generating profit for their 
shareholders, but also as important stakeholders in social development, capable of helping to 




even help to fill the existing gaps in regulation of TNCs. Firstly, they provide a strong benchmark 
for corporate behaviour, which may induce naming and shaming in the court of public opinion. 
Moreover, some TNCs are realizing the impact of these instruments and are voluntarily 
implementing them into their codes of conduct. Likewise, states are adopting the principles 
formulated in those instruments into national policies and action plans. Lastly, the principles and 
definitions contained in these soft law instruments may serve as inspiration for the drafting of a 
binding international treaty, or national legislation. The importance of the soft law instruments on 
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Abstrakt v českém jazyce 
 
Potřeba efektivní regulace nadnárodních společností a jejich odpovědnosti za porušování 
lidských práv je již po tři desetiletí tématem, které silně rezonuje v mezinárodní diskusi. 
Navrhovaná řešení nedostatku odpovědnosti v této souvislosti se ale, stále, velmi liší. Patří mezi 
ně například názor, že by povinnosti států podle existujících norem mezinárodního práva v oblasti 
lidských práv mohly být rozšířeny na obchodní korporace. Také by mohla být sjednána nová 
mezinárodní úmluva týkající se obchodu a lidských práv. Dalším z názorů je, že by nadnárodní 
společnosti měly být odpovědny podle národního práva. Tato práce byla původně inspirována 
touto diskusí a má za cíl identifikovat mezery v právní regulaci a poskytnout tak lepší porozumění 
tomu, které možnosti dalšího vývoje v této oblasti jsou možné a za jakých okolností.  
S ohledem na tyto cíle tato práce nejprve identifikuje překážky odpovědnosti nadnárodních 
společností za porušování lidských práv v rámci mezinárodního práva veřejného. Zaměřuje se 
přitom na koncepční analýzu právní osobnosti v mezinárodním právu veřejném a na meze právní 
osobnosti nestátních subjektů, konkrétně korporací, v mezinárodním právu týkajícím se lidských 
práv. Práce se dále věnuje mezinárodnímu trestnímu právu a zkoumá, zda mezinárodní trestní 
právo může sloužit jako prostředek výkonu práva v oblasti lidských práv. S ohledem na argument, 
že by měl být zachován status quo a ochrana lidských práv před korporacemi by měla být 
ponechána v rukou jednotlivých států, identifikuje tato práce také nejvýznamnější překážky 
odpovědnosti nadnárodních společností za porušování lidských práv na národní úrovni. Zaměřuje 
se přitom na teritoriální omezení jurisdikce států, na politické a ekonomické faktory, problematiku 
firemní roušky a také na některé překážky, kterým čelí žalobci v občanskoprávních sporech proti 
nadnárodním společnostem. Konečně se tato práce věnuje také odpovědnostním mechanismům, 
které nabízí vybrané právně nevynutitelné (soft law) nástroje týkající se sociální odpovědnosti 
podniků. Cílem je zjistit do jaké míry potenciálně mohou tyto nástroje vyplnit mezery v právně 
vynutitelné úpravě.  
V návaznosti na provedenou analýzu dochází tato práce k závěru, že za účelem zajištění 
odpovědných nadnárodních obchodních společností, které respektují mezinárodně uznaná lidská 
práva, je třeba řešit problémy způsobené jejich nadnárodním charakterem na mezinárodní úrovni. 
Z tohoto důvodu se jako nejvhodnější pro naplnění tohoto cíle jeví komplexní a jednotná 
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Abstract in English 
 
The need for an effective regulation of transnational corporations and its responsibility for 
human rights abuses has been a topic resonating strongly in the international debate for the past 
three decades. The suggested solutions to the lack of accountability of transnational business, 
however, still vary. Among them are suggestions that obligations of states under existing 
international human rights law could be extended to corporations, a new binding international 
treaty on business and human rights could be adopted, or that transnational corporations should be 
held to account under national law. This paper was initially inspired by this debate and seeks to 
identify the gaps and loopholes in legal regulation to provide better understanding of which ways 
forward are feasible and under what circumstances. 
Given these specific objectives, this paper firstly identifies the obstacles to holding 
transnational corporations responsible for human rights abuses under public international law. It 
focuses on a conceptual analysis of legal personality in public international law and the limits to 
legal personality of non-state actors, specifically corporations in international human rights law. 
This paper then turns to international criminal law and examines whether international criminal 
law is capable of providing the missing enforcement tool. Considering the argument in favour of 
maintaining the status quo and leaving the protection of human rights from business to individual 
states, this paper also identifies the most prominent obstacles to holding transnational corporations 
accountable for human rights abuses on the national level. It focuses on the territorial limitations 
of state jurisdiction, political and economic factors, the issue of corporate veil as well as certain 
jurisdictional hurdles posed to claimants in transnational civil liability cases. Lastly, this paper 
describes the accountability mechanisms offered by selected soft law instruments on corporate 
social responsibility. While doing so, it seeks to establish to what extent are these instruments 
potentially capable of filling the gaps in hard law. 
Upon this analysis, this paper draws the conclusion that in order to secure responsible 
transnational business which respects the internationally recognized human rights, the problems 
created by the transnationality of transnational corporations must be addressed on the international 
level. Therefore, a complex and uniform international regulation through international treaty law 
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